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18, 1985

Delaware v. Pensterer

Dear Sandra:
In his concurring opinion in California v.
Green, the Chief Justice emphasized 1 the importance
of allowing the states to experiment and innovate,
especially in the area of criminal justice. • 399
u.s. at 171. Because I believe that comment is
applicable to the Delaware court's consideration of
the question that is functionally equivalent to the
question left open in Green (and discussed in
footnote 18 on page 169), I adhere to my vote to deny
cert.
As you noted at pages S-6 of your circulating
per curiam, in Green the Court left open the question
of the admissibility of the stateaent •of a witness
who disclaims all present knowledge of the ultimate
event.• It seems to me that thi s case presents a
very siailar question. The witness, PBI agent
Robillard, disclaimed all present knowledge of the
basis for his opinion that one of the victim's hairs
bad been forcibly removed. And yet his qualification
as an expert implied that he had a valid reason for
reaching that conclusion at the time of his
investigation. Robillard's present inability to
r ecall that reason at trial deprived tbe defendant of
an 9.1P@rtanlty to challenge the agent's testl .ony (at
leait If one accepts tbe Delaware Supr... Cour t' s
ttadtag t bat •[w)itbout an acknovledt~ent of the
bia o.pinion, defense coaneel' • aroaeIWIIM:t t.t• of the Agent was notlllnt aoce
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knowledge, the same w
which to my mind .
ay I would decide this case,
representation oflnv?lves an implied prior
present knowl d
whlch the declarant disclaims
without f 11 e ge, I would not resolve this case
u
argument •
. Interestingly, as you remark at page 2 of your
the defense called upon or. DeForest to
t7st1fy that sometime before trial Robillard had told
h1m that he (Robillard) had relied on the follicular
tag theory to conclude that the hair was forcibly
:emoved. If Dr. DeForest's testimony had been
1ntroduced by the prosecution instead of the defense,
we would have a situation perfectly parallel to that
presented in Green because the officer in Green, ljKe
Dr. DeForest in this case, testified to the
declarant's prior, out-of-court statement which the
declarant now disavows at trial. Because of this
analogy, I would hesitate to rely on Dr. DeForest's
testimony to bar the Delaware Supreme Court from
invalidating the conviction on some other
constitutional ground, as you seem to imply in your
penultimate paragraph. This comment is not needed to
support the disposition you seek and is hazardous
considering that the record is not before us.
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Pln~on,

If the Court does conclude that the issue should
be resolved in this case, I would vote to grant cert
rather than to have the case decided summarily.
Respectfully,

Justice O'Connor
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